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国家工商行政管理局


企业动产抵押物登记管理办法


企业动产抵押物登记管理办法
1995年10月18日国家工商行政管理局令第35号公布
1998年12月3日国家工商行政管理局令第86号修订
2000年12月1日国家工商行政管理局令第98号修正

第一条　为加强对企业动产抵押物的登记管理，防止重复抵押，保障抵押债权的实现，根据《中华人民共和国担保法》的有关规定，制定本办法。
第二条　工商行政管理部门是企业动产抵押物的登记机关。
企业动产抵押物登记，由抵押物所在地的工商行政管理局办理。企业动产抵押物分别存放于两个以上不同登记机关辖区时，由主要抵押物所在地的市、县工商行政管理局登记，并将登记情况抄送抵押人登记注同机关和其他抵押物所在地的登记机关。
企业动产抵押物所在地与抵押人原登记注 关所在地一致的，由抵押人登记注册机关登记。
第三条　企业以除航空器、船舶、车辆以外的下列动产抵押的，应当在抵押合同签字盖章后到工商行政管理机关申请办理抵押物登记，抵押合同自登记之日起生效：
(一)企业的设备；
(二)企业的原辅材料；
(三)企业的产品或者商品；
(四)企业其他可以依法抵押的动产。
企业动产抵押后，该动产价值大于所担保债权的，其余额部分可以再次申请办理抵押登记。
第四条　输动产抵押登记，由抵押合同双方当事人共同向登记机关提交《企业动产抵押物登记申请书》，并提供下列文件或者其复印件：
(一)主合同和抵押合同；
(二)有关动产抵押物的所有权或者使用权证书；
(三)有关动产抵押物存放状况资料；
(四)抵押合同双方当事人的营业执照；
(五)双方代理人身份和权限证明文件；
(六)需要提供的其他资料。
第五条　《企业动产抵押物登记申请书》应当载明下列内容：
(一)抵押人和抵押权人的名称(姓名)、地址、法定代表人和代理人的姓名、性别、住所；
(二)申请抵押物登记的原因；
(三)抵押物的名称、数量、品牌、型号规格、号码、出厂日期、使用年限、价值、存放地等；
(四)抵押物的所有权或者使用权；
(五)被担保的主债权种类、数额；
(六)债务人履行债务的限期；
(七)抵押担保的范围；
(八)登记机关；
(九)申请人；
(十)申请日期。
第六条　企业动产抵押物的登记事项包括：抵押人，抵押权人，抵押合同，抵押物的名称、数量和价值，抵押担保的范围，被担保的主债权的种类和数额，债务人履行债务的期限。
企业动产抵押物登记应当根据登记事项设立《企业动产抵押物登记簿》，供社会查阅。
第七条　登记机关应当在受理登记申请材料后，依照国家法律、法规的规定，审查下列内容：
(一)第四条所列文件是否齐备；
(二)抵押合同条款是否齐备；
(三)用作抵押的动产是否重复登记；
(四)抵押物是否属于《中华人民共和国担保法》第三十七条禁止抵押的动产；
(五)抵押期限是否在动产抵押物权属期限或者使用年限内。
第八条　登记机关收齐登记申请材料之日为登记申请受理日。
登记机关应当自登记申请受理之日起5日内审查完毕，并决定是否予以登记。对符合抵押物登记条件的，发给《企业动产抵押物登记证》，并在抵押合同上签注《企业动产抵押物登记证》的编号、日期，加盖登记专用章；对不符合抵押登记条件的，书面通知申请人不予登记，并将申请材料退回申请人。
《企业动产抵押物登记证》的格式由国家工商行政管理局统一制定。
第九条　变更被担保的主债权种类、数额或者抵押担保的范围的，抵押合同双方当事人应当于作出变更决定之日起7日内，持变更协议、原《企业产抵押物登记证》和其他有关证明文件，向原登记机关申请办理变更登记。
同一动产向两个以上债权人抵押的，变更被担保的主债权数额时，必须征得后受偿的抵押权人的同意。
第十条　当事人延长债务人履行债务期限的，应当在到期之前一个月内，持延长债务人履行债务期限的协议、原《企业动产抵押物登记证》和其他有关证明文件，向原登记机关申请办理续期登记。
第十一条　当事人提前解除抵押合同的，应当自解除抵押合同的协议签字盖章后7日内，持解除抵押合同的协议和原《企业动产抵押物登记证》，向原登记机关办理注销登记，抵押合同自注销登记之日起失效。
第十二条　合同履行完毕或者抵押物灭失后，当事人应当于履行完毕或者抵押物灭失之日起7日内，持履行或者灭失凭证和原《企业动产抵押物登记证》，向原登记机关办理注销登记。
第十三条　提交虚假证明文件或者采取其他欺骗手段，骗取企业动产抵押物登记的，处以1万元以下的罚款。
第十四条　未按规定办理企业动产抵押物变更登记的，由动产抵押登记机关责令限期办理；逾期未办理的，处2000元以上5000元以下的罚款。
第十五条　登记机关办理动产抵押物登记时，按被担保的主债权的数额收取登记费。具体收费标准由国家工商行政管理局和有关部门共同制订。
登记费的承担收当事人协商；协商不成或者不愿协商的，由抵押合同双方当事人各承担一半。
第十六条　有关单位和个人，可以持合法身份证明文件，向登记机关查阅、抄录或者复印有关抵押物的资料，并按规定交纳费用。
第十七条　县级以上人民政府规定由工商行政管理部门办理城市房地产或者乡(镇)、村企业的厂户等建筑物抵押登记的，适用本办法的规定。
第十八条　以依法可以转让的商标专用权出质的，出质人和质权人应当于订立书面协议之日起20日内，向国家工商行政管理局办理出质登记，质押合同自登记之日起生效。
出质登记的具体程序参照本办法的规定执行。
第十九条　本办法由国家工商行政管理局负责解释。
第二十条　本办法自公布之日起施行。




Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU


OUTLINE


I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy





I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:

“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”

This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.

II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6

III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11